Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko salutes in front of servicemen during the joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises Zapad-2017. Zapad 2025 begins September 12. (Photo by Sergei GAPON / AFP) (Photo by SERGEI GAPON/AFP via Getty Images)
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Moscow seems bent on escalating tensions against the West around the sensitive time of 9,11 what with the recent incursion of Russian drones into Poland, and the upcoming joint Russia-Belarus military exercises entitled Zapad (September 12 – 16) on Belarusian soil, comprising some 13,000 troops. They tend to do the exercises with some regularity since the first one in 2009. The one in 2021 before the invasion of Ukraine involved 200,000 troops. Each time loud talk erupts in the West about the threat of a new flank opening against Ukraine via Belarus.
The threat has never materialized, no doubt because other countries participate albeit in small numbers and mostly as observers. Chiefly, though, Belarus strongman Lukashenko is loth to risk his sinecure by embarking on what would be a highly unpopular venture of war, not least among the armed forces. So the Zapad ritual is just that, a ritual, mostly as a show of solidarity to the world not unlike the Shanghai Co-operation Organization photo-ops.
Nevertheless, one shouldn’t then deduce that Belarus poses no threat to Ukraine or doesn’t aid Russia’s war effort in any concrete or significant way. Quite the reverse. Belarus acts as a secondary arms manufacturing center with both Chinese and Iranian weapons industry outposts pumping out material. Being hard to track, it’s hard to know how much of this reaches the front lines in Ukraine. Some data does exist however adumbrating the reality.
Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has emerged key in a web of military industrial partnerships from Moscow to Minsk, Tehran, and even Beijing. From January 2022-January 2023, 130,582 tons of ammunition was shipped from Belarus to Russian control. With volumes increasing drastically after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, in less than three years the Belarusian economy has become increasingly reliant on Russia—from 40–50% of exports prior to 2021 to 60–70% by mid-2023, exceeding 90% in some sectors.
In addition to ammunition, military exports from Belarus to Russia include:
-Wheeled platforms & vehicles
-Light industry goods
-Fortifications
-Explosive materials
-Radar and Optic Electronics
The two nations have reached an unprecedented level of strategic partnership in the military sphere, unprecedented by President Lushenko ’s own account at the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation this March.
“The Soviet Union’s experience confirmed it: only strong, economically capable states and unions are taken seriously. Alone, we will not be taken into account; no one will show us courtesy. That is why President Putin and I agreed that we must defend our common Fatherland together.”
This partnership includes tactical nuclear weapons from Russia. The latest Oreshnik hypersonic weapons complexes have already been transferred to Belarus, and will soon be put into service.
Belarus’s role extends beyond its own factories: it serves as a liaison, connecting Moscow to sympathetic nations that may not want to make their dealings publicly. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia has ordered more than 2,400 drones from Iran, which regularly attacks infrastructure and civilian facilities in Ukraine
Russia is considering the possibility of establishing the production of unmanned aerial vehicles of the Shahed type in Belarus. A full-fledged Iranian UAV in Belarus helps the Russian Federation solve logistical problems transporting drones from Iran. Iran has denied providing Russia with weapons for the war in Ukraine.
Meanwhile Belarusian-Iranian trade turnover increased threefold from 2021 to 2022.
In at a meeting with Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, Lukashenko gave his support for Iran against those “unfriendly” western powers. “Our response is clear: we must work more closely with each other, cooperate together, and resist these hostile actions,” he said.
During the military parade held on April 17, 2024 on the occasion of the National Army Day, Iran presented a new version of the newly developed Bavar-373 anti-aircraft missile system installed on the chassis of a MZKT-791300 8×8 truck manufactured in Belarus.
No publicly available sources specify the monetary value of arms or military equipment traded between Belarus and Iran.
As stated above Chinese weapons manufacture also occurs in Belarus.
Since at least 2022, the Chinese firm Shenzhen 5G has been an intermediary for Belarusian defence firm Peleng. Motors, sensors, and optics from Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese manufacturers make their way through Peleng to Russian frontlines.
The U.S. Treasury describes Peleng as “the exclusive supplier of fire-control systems for major lines of Russian tanks”.
Contemporary military supply chains are often a multiply and confusingly synthesized product of multinational sources. Against that, the 49% state-owned Belarusian Peleng and its immediate impact on the Ukrainian conflict is a rare exception. It is an unusual example of Belarus visibly sticking its neck out in a publicly identifiable way.
China’s collaboration in the conspicuous supply out of Belarus is also a rather obvious way of signaling its participation in the conflict, a far cry from its official stance of Beijing’s official stance of neutrality.
So why such an investment into the military partnership of Belarus? For Moscow, Belarus ties down Ukrainian troops along the northern frontier, even if all out war from Belarus is unlikely. It channels ammunition and supplies into Russia through less visible routes, while doubling as a secure warehouse for missiles and shells beyond the reach of Ukrainian strikes, at least while Belarus stays out of direct hostilities. This storehouse effect may also explain Iranian interests. That is to say, Belarus offers an off-shore location for vulnerable countries like Iran to store their weapons in a safe place (away from Israeli strikes). And of course, there is simply the issue of avoiding sanctions. As a conduit for restricted components and technologies, Belarus serves as a useful way-station for quiet sanctions busting. In all these ways Belarus occupies unique political space, a small but active and yet somehow untouchable agent in Russia’s war machine.